Files
francis.wang 4c86c082a2 Initial commit: OpenWrt-Yocto monorepo
Combine poky (Yocto scarthgap), meta-openembedded (scarthgap), and
meta-openwrt into a single repository.

Components:
- poky/             Yocto core framework (BitBake + OE-Core)
- meta-openembedded/ Community layers (meta-oe, meta-python, meta-networking)
- meta-openwrt/     OpenWrt customization layer
- setup-env.sh      One-click build environment setup
- README.md         Project documentation
2026-07-11 13:28:01 +08:00

161 lines
4.6 KiB
Diff

From 2c81f47508fa6bce9df84e3b43dfb16dffb742a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 15:51:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives
Description of the vulnerability from the NIST CVE tracker [1]:
Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the (1)
tar_extract_glob and (2) tar_extract_all functions in libtar 1.2.20
and earlier allow remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via
a .. (dot dot) in a crafted tar file.
Imported from the Debian libtar package 1.2.20-8 [2]. Original Debian
description:
Author: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/731860
Description: Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives
by skipping over leading slashes and any prefix containing ".." components.
Forwarded: yes
meta-openembedded uses Debian's release tarball [3]. Debian uses
repo.or.cz/libtar.git as their upstream [4]. repo.or.cz/libtar.git has
been inactive since 2013 [5].
CVE: CVE-2013-4420
Upstream-Status: Inactive-Upstream [lastrelease: 2013 lastcommit: 2013]
Comments: Added the commit message
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4420
[2] https://sources.debian.org/patches/libtar/1.2.20-8/CVE-2013-4420.patch/
[3] https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded/tree/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/libtar_1.2.20.bb?h=master#n8
[4] http://svn.kibibyte.se/libtar/trunk/debian/control (rev 51; not tagged)
[5] https://repo.or.cz/libtar.git/shortlog/refs/heads/master
Signed-off-by: Katariina Lounento <katariina.lounento@vaisala.com>
---
lib/decode.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/extract.c | 8 ++++----
lib/internal.h | 1 +
lib/output.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/decode.c b/lib/decode.c
index 35312be..edd5f2e 100644
--- a/lib/decode.c
+++ b/lib/decode.c
@@ -22,13 +22,42 @@
# include <string.h>
#endif
+char *
+safer_name_suffix (char const *file_name)
+{
+ char const *p, *t;
+ p = t = file_name;
+ while (*p == '/') t = ++p;
+ while (*p)
+ {
+ while (p[0] == '.' && p[0] == p[1] && p[2] == '/')
+ {
+ p += 3;
+ t = p;
+ }
+ /* advance pointer past the next slash */
+ while (*p && (p++)[0] != '/');
+ }
+
+ if (!*t)
+ {
+ t = ".";
+ }
+
+ if (t != file_name)
+ {
+ /* TODO: warn somehow that the path was modified */
+ }
+ return (char*)t;
+}
+
/* determine full path name */
char *
th_get_pathname(TAR *t)
{
if (t->th_buf.gnu_longname)
- return t->th_buf.gnu_longname;
+ return safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longname);
/* allocate the th_pathname buffer if not already */
if (t->th_pathname == NULL)
@@ -50,7 +79,7 @@ th_get_pathname(TAR *t)
}
/* will be deallocated in tar_close() */
- return t->th_pathname;
+ return safer_name_suffix(t->th_pathname);
}
diff --git a/lib/extract.c b/lib/extract.c
index 9fc6ad5..4ff1a95 100644
--- a/lib/extract.c
+++ b/lib/extract.c
@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ tar_extract_hardlink(TAR * t, char *realname)
if (mkdirhier(dirname(filename)) == -1)
return -1;
libtar_hashptr_reset(&hp);
- if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, th_get_linkname(t),
+ if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)),
(libtar_matchfunc_t)libtar_str_match) != 0)
{
lnp = (char *)libtar_hashptr_data(&hp);
linktgt = &lnp[strlen(lnp) + 1];
}
else
- linktgt = th_get_linkname(t);
+ linktgt = safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t));
#ifdef DEBUG
printf(" ==> extracting: %s (link to %s)\n", filename, linktgt);
@@ -347,9 +347,9 @@ tar_extract_symlink(TAR *t, char *realname)
#ifdef DEBUG
printf(" ==> extracting: %s (symlink to %s)\n",
- filename, th_get_linkname(t));
+ filename, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)));
#endif
- if (symlink(th_get_linkname(t), filename) == -1)
+ if (symlink(safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)), filename) == -1)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
perror("symlink()");
diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h
index da7be7f..f05ca4f 100644
--- a/lib/internal.h
+++ b/lib/internal.h
@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@
#define TLS_THREAD
#endif
+char* safer_name_suffix(char const*);
diff --git a/lib/output.c b/lib/output.c
index a5262ee..af754f1 100644
--- a/lib/output.c
+++ b/lib/output.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ th_print_long_ls(TAR *t)
else
printf(" link to ");
if ((t->options & TAR_GNU) && t->th_buf.gnu_longlink != NULL)
- printf("%s", t->th_buf.gnu_longlink);
+ printf("%s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longlink));
else
- printf("%.100s", t->th_buf.linkname);
+ printf("%.100s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.linkname));
}
putchar('\n');