Files
francis.wang 4c86c082a2 Initial commit: OpenWrt-Yocto monorepo
Combine poky (Yocto scarthgap), meta-openembedded (scarthgap), and
meta-openwrt into a single repository.

Components:
- poky/             Yocto core framework (BitBake + OE-Core)
- meta-openembedded/ Community layers (meta-oe, meta-python, meta-networking)
- meta-openwrt/     OpenWrt customization layer
- setup-env.sh      One-click build environment setup
- README.md         Project documentation
2026-07-11 13:28:01 +08:00

40 lines
1.5 KiB
Diff

From f158664062e049ec4604f6e772551a00575011f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 16:24:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses()
CVE-2026-5172
Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this.
The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the
call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1
past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation
of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results
in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash.
CVE: CVE-2026-5172
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=073082ddc0aba7b8efa15a688d6183463b65effa]
Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE (Schneider Electric) <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com>
---
src/rfc1035.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
index 387d894a..32dc5711 100644
--- a/src/rfc1035.c
+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
@@ -932,7 +932,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
/* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
int len;
- if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
+ /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */
+ if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0) || (p1 > endrr))
{
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
return 2;
--
2.43.0